Abstract

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**"The imperative of responsibility" or Jonas' justification gap as a challenge to Jonas Research**

In the small introduction, the author thanks the organizers, Rector Burckhart, Vice-Rector Bongardt, and Chairman Nielsen-Sikora. He greets the participants of the discourse. He also asks the Jonas researchers to concentrate their expertise on Jonas' deficit in the binding proof of the principle of responsibility for the future.

In chapter 2 he reconstructs the "priority of the question of principle". Jonas understands the "principle" as a principle of being as well as an imperative and validity criterion.

In chapter 3 it is shown: Jonas links the "ontological responsibility for the idea of ​​the human being" with the criterion of a possible "agreement ... of the humanity of the future". And he gives – in a transcendental philosophical manner! - a proof of futility in naturalistic "epiphenomenalism". But he trusts less the transcendental-reflective rather than the ontological argument, though he admits that his "metaphysical deduction" "merely offers an option "over which one must" go.

With reference to H.-G. Gadamer, Dieter Henrich and above all Karl-Otto Apel's transcendental pragmatics Chapter 4 demonstrates that a meaningful-critical reflection on 'me' and 'you' in the current dialogue (in which we bring out a thesis or a doubt), leads to that principle-bindingness which Jonas seeks, but misses in the end due to his ontologically thinking.

The fifth chapter is predominantly immanent: Jonas' "thinking experiments" and his utopia-critical intention to understand the real, "ambiguous" people are reconstructed. On the other hand, the postscript is again critical: Jonas does not recognize four things: Jürgen Habermas confuses a real discussion with a purely argumentative, so far ideal discourse, which would correspond to the actually "regulative" discourse principle. Moreover, Jonas does not know or realize that transcendental pragmatists, unlike Habermas, start from this distinction. Thirdly, he assumes that both sides, not only Habermas but also the transcendental pragmatists, begin immediately with a "practical discourse" whose participants, all well-disposed, have recognized the duty to seek and follow moral norms. Fourthly: Jonas rightly recognizes in this condition a vicious circle; yet he fails to appreciate that Apel and his scholars argue the same way, so they rather target the skeptic to prove the "inalienability" of the earnest discourse.