

Ties of solidarity and the political spectrum: partisan cleavages in reported solidarity activity across Europe

Johannes M. Kiess (University of Siegen)

Hans-Jörg Trenz (University of Copenhagen and Arena, University of Oslo)

Abstract: The strength of solidarity ties among individuals is often discussed in relation to membership within a community of equals. This assumes strong links between reported solidarity actions, political attitudes, and national identity. We ask, first, whether differences in solidarity engagement can be explained by party affiliation: Do adherents of political parties driven by right-identitarian politics and adherents of parties driven by left-redistributive politics differ considerably in terms of reported solidarity action? Secondly, we investigate, whether such differences can be explained by the nationality of the supported groups and, thirdly, we explore whether there is a salience of reported solidarity action and party affiliation across European countries. We examine these questions by looking at cleavages in reported solidarity action in support of three different target groups: unemployed, disabled persons, and refugees. Our findings indicate first of all that partisan affiliation matters: cleavages in solidarity behavior follow traditional ideological patterns. Secondly, and contrary to the exclusive-communitarian rhetoric that is found in party programs and statements of right-wing populist parties, their adherents are among those supporting both nationals *and* foreigners least, while adherents of left and radical left parties engage in support towards nationals and non-nationals. Third, from a comparative European perspective, we observe similar patterns of a divide between an inclusive, solidary, and cosmopolitan left and a non-solidary right with low interests in community commitment.

Keywords: Right-wing populism, solidarity, solidary activity, partisan cleavage, party attachment

Johannes M. Kiess is senior researcher in sociology at the Faculty of Arts at Siegen University. His research focuses in political sociology, particularly on right-wing extremism, European integration, and industrial relations.

Hans-Jörg Trenz is professor in Modern European Studies at the University of Copenhagen and adjunct professor at ARENA, Centre for European Studies at University of Oslo. His research focuses in sociology of European integration and transnationalisation, political communication, public sphere and the media.

1 Introduction¹: cleavages of solidarity practices

The way solidarity is contested among citizens in Western democracies is usually seen as closely related to ideological partisan affiliation. Supporters of left parties are more inclined to defend a notion of redistributive justice and supporters of right parties often emphasize moral responsibility

and authoritarian control over persons in need of assistance (Lewin-Epstein, Kaplan & Levanon 2003; Likki & Staerklé 2014).

This framework for solidarity contestation along ideological cleavages is currently challenged by processes of transnationalization and their expected impact on individual solidarity behavior and practices. The transnationalization of society has ambivalent effects on solidarity bonds among citizens. While global markets have undoubtedly contributed to the dismantling of national welfare, we also observe a new critical engagement with social justice at the global scale related to the mobilization of resistances that facilitate new social bonds and citizens' allegiances beyond their regionally or nationally bound solidarity communities.

National welfare states are ambivalent in the way they encounter the challenges of globalization, immigration, and diversity (Kymlicka 2015). On the one hand, they follow an inclusive logic of rights towards persons in need, which often applies irrespectively of their nationality (universal justice). On the other hand, they increasingly apply criteria of deservingness to restrict services for both nationals and non-nationals or to exclude particular groups (often non-nationals) from the bonds of solidarity. Such ambivalence is forcing a choice between progressive-inclusive and regressive-exclusive alternatives to the building of solidarity relationships, which is likely to find expression also at the level of individual attitudes and behavior. As a result of such choices, expressions of solidarity would be bipolar with individuals opting between a 'cosmopolitan' and a 'communitarian' variant (de Wilde and Zürn 2013), the former following a notion of humanitarian (universal) solidarity beyond the confines of the national community and the latter opting for an exclusive notion of solidarity and the distribution of welfare within the bounded community of co-nationals.

In this article, we ask how reported solidarity behavior correlates with partisan affiliation. We test the salience of traditional ideological partisan cleavages between supporters of the left and the right as an explanatory factor for individual solidarity action towards three different target groups: unemployed, disabled persons and refugees. Supporters of left parties would expectedly show high levels of support towards all three target groups (universal justice), supporters of right-conservative and liberal parties, instead would emphasize individual responsibility, not necessarily distinguishing between the three target groups. We further investigate whether there is a new bipolar constellation of reported solidarity behavior that follows the lines of a new cultural-identitarian divide between cosmopolitans and communitarians. That latter cleavage would become identifiable in a distinct group of 'communitarians' (expectedly voters of conservative or right-wing populist parties) who

distinguish between in-group solidarity towards unemployed and disabled and outgroup exclusion towards refugees.

To proceed, we will first review the literature on emerging partisan cleavages in relation to Europeanization and globalization, which allows us to formulate our research hypotheses of expected differences in reported solidarity action. Secondly, we present our unique data basis, which allows us to measure individual solidarity activity targeting different groups (unemployed, disabled, and refugees) in relation to party affiliation. We then discuss our results for reported solidarity action and partisan affiliation in eight European countries, allowing us to test the hypotheses with regard to actual engagement in different forms of solidarity action.

2 Contested notions of solidarity: Towards a new communitarian-cosmopolitan divide?

Solidarity implies a readiness for collective action in the form of mutual assistance (Stjerno 2004: 2). As such, it is generally believed to be connected to group-boundedness, social and spatial proximity, principal reciprocity, and/or notions of deservingness regarding different groups of beneficiaries. Empirical research has investigated individual solidarity dispositions in relation to (welfare) attitudes (e.g. Likki & Staerke 2014; Mau & Burkhardt 2011), political contestation (e.g. Giugni & Passy 2001) and, more recently, also in the context of European integration and recent economic and migration crises (e.g. Bauböck & Scholten 2016; Lahusen & Grasso 2018). For the purpose of this study, we wish to focus on the question of how solidarity behavior towards different target groups (in-groups and out-groups) is explained by political-ideological dispositions. This regards, in particular, the question of whether differences in reported solidarity action can be explained by traditional left-right ideological or by new identitarian cleavages.

Support for unemployed or the sick and old is associated with egalitarianism and social justice (Blekesaune & Quadagno 2003), an agenda that is typically defended by left parties (Bobbio 1997; van der Brug & van Spanje 2009). Thus, we would expect adherents of the political left to embrace universal welfare and adherents of the political right to emphasize individual responsibility over collective solidarity commitment (Stjerno 2004). Our first hypothesis is that supporters of left parties embrace a universal notion of solidarity that explains their high degrees of solidarity engagement towards all target groups, while supporters of liberal and right parties reject universal welfare and show only low engagement in solidarity action.

More recently, it has been emphasized, however, that questions of opening or closure of borders are debated controversially with references to identity, not ideology (De Wilde & Zürn 2013; Kriesi et al. 2012). This literature points at an emerging cosmopolitan/identitarian party cleavage, which stands for a deep conflict between those who adhere to universal humanitarian norms and those who give preference to particularistic cultural attachments. Consequently, we would expect a trade-off between nationally bounded notions of solidarity against European and transnational solidarity. Such a trade-off would indicate a new salience of cultural-identitarian struggles and conflicts about globalization (Teney et al. 2014; Zürn 2014). This divide is further found to be related to two different lifestyles that impact attitudes in terms of openness towards strangers, the rejection or affirmation of solidarity trade-offs between different groups and the likelihood to support global justice against national sovereignty (Mau, Mewes & Zimmermann 2008; Shapcott 2001). Politicising this cosmopolitan/communitarian cleavage results in new divisions between political parties and consequently of populations within and beyond the nation state. Our second hypothesis regards therefore the salience of a new communitarian-cosmopolitan cleavage: We expect that right-wing populist parties have emerged as the sturdiest defenders of national exclusive notions of solidarity, with their adherents expressing the strongest preference for in-group solidarity and applying a solidarity trade-off in their individual patterns of engagement towards different target groups of solidarity (unemployed, disabled, and refugees). At the other end of the political spectrum, we would expect to find old and new left parties as the strongest defenders of humanitarian justice with their supporters rejecting solidarity trade-offs between in-group and out-groups and embracing the normative obligations from the universal status of human rights.

Our expectation of the new salience of solidarity contestations between the bounded nation state and Europe or the world can be further derived from the comparative literature on populism. Populists and their supporters are defined as dividers, not as unifiers (Mudde 2016; Müller 2016). As such they seek polarization of attitudes and opinion, and not compromise with the political opponent. Debates about solidarity are one important field where such fundamental conflicts find expression and division lines between the 'real people' and the 'enemies of the people' (elites and foreigners) are drawn. For populists, solidarity is, based on their claim to sole representation of 'the people', non-negotiable. It belongs to one particular group and cannot be divided. Especially in the case of right-wing populist parties, such an idea of homogeneous people is combined with an ideology of nativism, which holds that states should be exclusively inhabited by one national group that belongs to a particular territory (Guia 2016). Such a unitary notion of the people as 'natives'

would translate into strong ties of national solidarity and a categorical rejection of transnational solidarity and humanitarianism (Jamin 2013). Right-wing populist parties are consequently observed to promote notions of ‘exclusive solidarity’ (Lefkofridi & Michel 2014). From a comparative perspective we formulate our third hypothesis of convergence of right-wing communitarian populism in Western Europe: we expect to find the contours of a populist right that is distinct in all countries under investigation in their promotion of a trade-off between nationally bounded notions of solidarity against European and transnational solidarity.

3 Data and methods

Given the focus of other studies on explaining individual attitudes (most recently Gerhards et al. 2018), we focus in this analysis on reported solidarity action. The TransSOL survey conducted in 8 countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, UK) in January 2017 provides for a unique and original way of measuring solidarity by including questions related to attitudes towards different beneficiary groups of solidarity and questions related to reported action (see Lahusen & Grasso 2018)ⁱⁱ.

Our three dependent variables are solidarity activities towards refugees, towards unemployed, and towards disabled. Respondents were asked whether they previously had engaged in solidarity activity in support of these groups in a number of ways (“Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of ...”, see Appendix). In order to use this multi-faceted instrument in a less complex binominal regression analysis we reduced it to a dummy per group (also Kiess et al. 2018), thus giving us a measure for general activity (factor analysis revealed only one factor, coefficient alphas in Appendix). Multinomial regressions with scales of activity produced similar results (not reported here).

Our main independent variable is party attachment: Parties fulfill their democratic function if people identify with them and thus provide a functioning way of political expression (Dalton & Wattenberg 2002). We decided for party attachment (vote intention produced similar results) because, on the theoretical level, we are interested in partisan and ideological cleavages. Variation in our dependent variables indicates an ideological cleavage, if reported solidarity action towards all three target groups differs along a left-right axis. It indicates a new identitarian cleavage, if reported solidarity action underlies an in-group-out-group distinction, with particularly supporters of populist-right parties trading off the deservingness among the three target groups (inclusive towards

unemployed and disabled and exclusive towards refugees). We further argue that party attachment is relatively stable and a rather explicit political statement. Voting, however, might be considered first and foremost a (reported) action (vote intention being only planned action), which sometimes can have tactical aspects as well (Dalton 2016). In our survey, respondents were asked “Which of the following parties do you feel closest to?”

We also included variables asking respondents about their attachment toward different spatial entities to validate our assumptions about a cosmopolitan-communitarian divide. Belonging and its most institutionalized form citizenship are strongly connected to participatory politics (Yuval-Davis 2006). Feeling attached towards wider or narrower spatial entities, therefore, may influence which groups respondents support. We read high attachment to the respondents’ respective country as related towards communitarian identity and to larger spatial entities (EU, humanity/world) as cosmopolitan.ⁱⁱⁱ Furthermore we include gender, age, income, and education as classic control variables for political participation and party identification (Verba 1978; Brady et al. 1995; Dalton 2016). Thus, we expect these variables to have considerable impact but are not concerned with this aspect here.

Due to the differences in political and party systems across countries^{iv}, we conducted our statistical analysis for each country separately. For the linear regression analyses we took center-right parties as reference categories. First we estimated the impact of party attachment on solidarity activity. Secondly, we tested the stability of our findings by including a limited set of controls. We report percentages of solidarity activity across the political spectrum for Germany and regression coefficients for the German, Danish, and UK cases (the models easiest to comprehend) here and provide the remaining tables in the online appendix.

4 Solidarity practices and party attachment across eight countries

Solidarity engagement across countries

Table 1 presents an overview of solidarity activity towards three target groups and across countries: respondents from Greece and Switzerland followed by Poland are most engaged in solidarity activities toward disabled people. Towards the unemployed, Greeks appear to be by far most solidary with less variation across the other countries. Towards refugees we find again Greece with the most reported activity, followed, with some distance, by Germany, Switzerland, and Denmark. Conversely, respondents from the UK report the least solidarity activities to all groups. The French

also are less engaged in solidarity activities across issues while Italians and Danish take a lower middle position. These patterns probably are connected to national contexts (e.g. high unemployment in Greece, salience of refugee crisis in Germany and Greece). Such contextual factors for cross-country variation of solidarity need to be kept in mind in the following when focusing exclusively on variations (and similarities) of political spectra across countries.

Table 1: Solidarity activity towards three groups and across eight countries (in %)

Solidarity towards	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	Switzerland	UK	Total
Disabled	46.0	50.1	51.5	63.5	49.6	64.8	66.8	34.4	53.4
unemployed	27.7	23.7	27.1	55.7	35.8	40.4	32.6	18.5	32.6
Refugees	31.9	19.8	34.0	39.1	27.7	26.7	33.1	21.5	29.2
N ^v	2,183	2,098	2,064	2,061	2,087	2,119	2,221	2,083	16,916

Traditional cleavages and solidarity activity

Our first hypothesis states that solidarity activity correlates with partisanship, i.e. reported party attachment. More specifically, we expect respondents feeling attached to (center) left parties^{vi}, traditionally oriented towards redistributive politics, to be more involved in solidarity activities. In contrast, conservatism and liberalism, we assume, are associated with market solutions and authoritarian control of those in need, as well as values like individual responsibility, leading to less solidarity activity from people attached to (center) right parties. Table 2 accordingly reports solidarity activity across political spectra in Germany (for the remaining countries see Appendix).

For Germany, Denmark, and the UK we can confirm that in North-Western European countries partisan cleavages in terms of solidarity activity are clearly visible, i.e. respondents attached to right-wing parties tend to be less active on behalf of others. In Germany, we can identify three groups: the Left, the Social-democrats (SPD), and the Greens, although with some variation across issues, all are followed by people with relatively high engagement. Respondents feeling attached to market-liberal FDP and Christian-democratic CDU are less often active across fields, but the targeted groups are ranked the same as with left-wing parties (in decreasing order: disabled, refugees, unemployed). AfD (*Alternative für Deutschland*) followers are distinct only regarding solidarity towards refugees: Their engagement towards the disabled and unemployed is similarly low to the one of conservatives and liberals, but they show lowest degree of engagement towards

refugees. In the UK we find a similar pattern with the difference of the *Liberal Democrats* actually belonging to the group of center-left parties (including SNP, *Greens*, and *Labor*). Conservatives and followers of UKIP are less solidary across all issue fields. In Denmark we observe a similarly clear partisan divide at least for two issue fields, namely solidarity activity supporting unemployed and refugees. Like UKIP and AfD supporters, people who feel attached to right-wing populist *Dansk Folkeparti* are least supportive of refugees, distinguishing them from followers of center-right and liberal parties.

Turning to France, Italy, and Greece, the picture is less clear but still supports our main claims. In France there is a clear left-right cleavage in solidarity activity except for solidarity towards disabled people. Almost 40% of the French respondents answered ‘not feeling attached to any party’ or checked ‘don’t know’, compared to below 30% in the three North-Western European countries. These respondents generally show little solidarity activity, however, here ideological motifs are less clear. The success of Macron’s *En Marche* and the last national election campaign disrupting the traditional party system of the Fifth Republic might explain some of the divergence in comparison to the three North-Western countries. Going further South, Italy as well has recently seen considerable changes in its party system, especially on the far-right, with two parties defending a communitarian exclusive notion of solidarity (*Fratelli d’Italia* and *Lega Nord*) and the *Five Star Movement* campaigning against ‘the establishment’. Again, the expected left-right division in solidarity behavior is less pronounced than in the North-Western European cases: While there is a general tendency of the left for inclusive solidarity towards all groups and of the right to be less engaged in solidarity, there are also two significant outliers: supporters of the social-democratic PD show low engagement towards all groups and supporters of the Christian-democratic UDC are more likely to engage in solidarity activity.^{vii} Finally the case of Greece supports our hypothesis, both when we compare supporters of center-left *PASOK* with center-right *Nea Dimokratia* as well as across the spectrum, where we find respondents of radical left *SYRIZA* to be most solidaristic. Like followers of the British *Liberal Democrats*, supporters of liberal *Potami* belong, regarding solidarity activity, rather to the left than to the right (in contrast to German and Danish Liberals)

Summing up, we can confirm our first hypothesis with some restrictions. We find a clear partisan divide across issue fields in six out of eight countries. We have two exceptions, namely Poland and Switzerland, where only those attached to far-right (but not followers of center-right and liberal) parties stand out as less solidary. The differences in party and political systems as well as more recent shifts in some countries, where new parties challenge historically grown parliamentary

traditions (*Five Star Movement* in Italy, *AfD* in Germany, *En Marche* in France), caution us to be too generalizing. Taking these restrictions into account, the best fit for our hypothesis regarding a traditional left-right partisan divide in solidarity activity seems to lie in the North-Western European countries, namely Germany, Denmark, and the UK.

Table 2: Party attachment and solidarity activity in Germany (in %)

Party	unemployed	disabled	Refugees
Left	38.4	53.0	43.5
Greens	32.5	64.4	51.1
SPD	30.9	56.7	44.2
CDU	23.4	53.2	35.6
FDP	26.9	52.9	34.6
AfD	27.4	51.6	11.6
No party	20.0	42.6	22.1
DN	19.6	41.4	24.8
Total	26.7	51.7	33.7

Explanations: ‘Other’, NPD, and Pirates were excluded due to low N.

The ‘new’ right as communitarians?

We further assumed trade-offs between national and transnational recipients of solidarity to distinguish supporters of right-wing from left-wing parties introducing thus a new communitarian versus cosmopolitan cleavage as an explanatory factor for individual solidarity engagement (hypothesis 2). We further assumed supporters of right-wing populist parties to stand out as the fiercest promoters of ‘exclusive solidarity’ across Western European countries (hypothesis 3).

An earlier study of the *UK Independence Party* (UKIP) identified the supporter base as partly being strategic (middle class) Eurosceptics and ‘polite’ (i.e. clearly distinguished from openly fascist BNP, supported by xenophobes from less affluent classes) (Ford et al. 2012). The AfD’s founding was similarly driven by rejection of European integration and its program oscillates between extreme market-liberalism, anti-immigrant nationalism, and ultra-conservatism (Dietl 2017). As the tables already introduced show, however, the strong rejection of transnational solidarity with refugees is not translated into support of national cohesion. To the contrary, UKIP, AfD, and *Dansk Folkeparti* supporters are among those least engaged in solidarity action towards all groups and as such clearly distinguished from supporters of other parties, who are not trading off in-group and out-groups. The dividing line is thus between universalistic solidarity and rejection of solidarity, not

between cosmopolitans and communitarians. In France, too, supporters of extreme right *Front National*, do not trade-off communitarian and cosmopolitan solidarity, rather they show least solidarity towards both nationals and foreigners. The same holds for supporters of Italian extreme right parties (*Fratelli d'Italia* and *Lega Nord*), Korwin supporters in Poland and *Golden Dawn* supporters in Greece, who are all among those least engaged in solidarity activities across all three target groups.

Looking at all eight countries, we observe that supporters of right-centrist parties are not more active towards nationals (unemployed, disabled) nor towards refugees when compared with left supporters (rejecting hypothesis 2). This underlines the left-right partisan divide along individual responsibility over collective solidarity commitment (confirming hypothesis 1). Moreover, and again in rejection of hypothesis 2, supporters of right-wing populist parties tend to be the least solidary towards all three groups. The very low rates of support towards (non-national) refugees do not seem to result in higher (communitarian) support of unemployed and disabled persons. Looking at parties on the left, however, cosmopolitans are clearly identifiable in their high engagement in solidarity action *and* rejection of solidarity trade-offs between the three groups. Cosmopolitan orientation thus strongly overlaps with left-ideological orientation, blurring the lines between identitarian and ideological cleavages. In support of hypothesis 3, followers of right-wing populist parties show similar patterns of (low) solidarity engagement.

Validity of party attachment as predictor of solidarity across countries

In order to test the validity of our descriptive results and to control for socio-demographic factors we calculated linear regression models for all eight countries. In order to use the ordinal variable 'party attachment', we split it in dummies. We then took the center-right party in each country as base outcome because we are particularly interested in the left-right continuum and in far-right supporters.

The base models confirm the cross-tables discussed above: across countries, partisanship and traditional ideological cleavages matter for solidarity activity. The control models confirm the pattern on a general level while we have to acknowledge that the effects of party attachment on solidarity activity are not robust for every party in every country (partially against hypothesis 1). We confirm that there is no trade-off (favoring nationals at the expense of refugees) by right-wing voters (rejecting hypothesis 2). Supporters of Greek *Golden Dawn* are an exception as they support unemployed more likely compared to conservatives, but the coefficient is still smaller than that for

left supporters who are more likely engaged. As for socio-demographics, age, education, and income positively correlate – to varying degrees across countries – with solidarity activity, which is in accordance with classic studies on political behavior and social movements emphasizing that resources, skills, and opportunities matter (Brady et al. 1995; Verba et al. 1978; Jenkins 1983).

Finally, we introduced variables measuring attachment to different spatial entities. While the unambiguity across countries varies, the findings point in the same direction: those feeling attached to their country are less engaged in solidarity towards refugees while attachment to humanity/the world and (especially in the UK) to Europe/the EU correlate positively with engagement towards refugees but also (to a lesser extent) towards unemployed and disabled. These findings point at a divide between those more attached to their country and those attached to Europe/humanity, which is, however, not congruent with a cosmopolitan and communitarian divide. Rather, those feeling attached to their country are not more likely to be solidary towards co-nationals (unemployed and disabled). Conversely, ‘cosmopolitans’ are more solidary to all three groups.

Table 3: Regression models UK

	base models			control models		
	unemployed	disabled	refugees	Unemployed	disabled	refugees
Greens	0.106**	0.097	0.177**	0.009	0.024	0.019
Labour	0.093**	0.011	0.138**	0.023	-0.071*	0.022
SNP	0.114*	0.143*	0.231**	0.065	0.092	0.113
Tories	---	---	---	---	---	---
LibDem	0.042	0.080	0.180**	-0.023	-0.022	0.060
UKIP	-0.026	-0.033	-0.075*	0.029	0.013	-0.022
No Party	-0.056*	-0.099**	-0.050	-0.055	-0.102**	-0.080**
Don't know	-0.056	-0.133**	-0.008	-0.043	-0.086	-0.039
Higher age				-0.046**	-0.027*	-0.033**
Male				0.044*	0.024	-0.018
Higher income				-0.004	-0.009	-0.016
higher education				0.019*	0.022	0.043**
Att_Country				-0.012	-0.007	-0.037**
Att_EU				0.067**	0.043**	0.076**
Att_Humanity				0.034**	0.083**	0.072**
_cons	0.168**	0.359**	0.172**	0.185**	0.395**	0.252**
R2	0.03	0.02	0.06	0.10	0.08	0.17
N	2,044	2,044	2,044	1,663	1,663	1,663

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Regression models Denmark

	base models	control models
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	unemployed	disabled	refugees	unemployed	disabled	refugees
Radikale	0.096	-0.155	0.315**	0.089	-0.164	0.173*
Soc Folks	0.148*	-0.044	0.200**	0.141	-0.061	0.189*
Enheds	0.274**	-0.010	0.340**	0.266**	-0.006	0.331**
Socialdemocrats	0.139*	-0.021	0.151**	0.125	-0.022	0.149*
Liberal	-0.009	-0.197*	0.032	-0.024	-0.205*	-0.049
Konservat	---	---	---	---	---	---
Venstre	0.075	-0.041	0.013	0.052	-0.082	-0.020
Dansk VP	0.080	-0.069	-0.100	0.084	-0.033	-0.034
No Party	0.023	-0.140*	-0.028	0.028	-0.084	-0.040
Don't know	0.039	-0.194**	-0.031	0.095	-0.122	-0.028
Higher age				0.024*	0.050**	-0.021
Male				0.070**	-0.027	-0.008
Higher income				-0.013	0.001	0.024*
higher education				0.009	0.023*	0.048**
Att_Country				-0.033	-0.002	-0.058**
Att_EU				0.036	0.039*	0.057**
Att_Humanity				0.023	-0.007	0.057**
_cons	0.175**	0.525**	0.232**	0.162*	0.521**	0.300**
R2	0.03	0.02	0.09	0.05	0.04	0.17
N	2,092	2,092	2,092	1,582	1,582	1,582

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Regression models Germany

	base models			control models		
	unemployed	disabled	refugees	Unemployed	disabled	Refugees
Left	0.149**	-0.003	0.080*	0.177**	0.019	0.071
Greens	0.090*	0.110*	0.154**	0.085*	0.101*	0.97*
SPD	0.078*	0.037	0.086*	0.080*	0.031	0.084*
CDU	---	---	---	---	---	---
FDP	0.037	-0.005	-0.012	0.036	-0.062	-0.063
AfD	0.041	-0.015	-0.241**	0.100*	0.073	-0.161**
No party	-0.033	-0.105**	-0.134**	0.014	-0.031	-0.106**
Don't know	-0.031	-0.113*	-0.107*	-0.012	-0.028	-0.109
Higher age				-0.036**	0.011	-0.046**
Male				0.039	-0.005	-0.021
Higher income				0.016	0.027*	0.031**
higher education				0.017	0.027*	0.019
Att_Country				-0.017	0.005	-0.046**
Att_EU				0.049**	0.041**	0.084**
Att_Humanity				0.018	0.070**	0.030*
_cons	0.232**	0.532**	0.357**	0.192**	0.509**	0.348**
\bar{R}^2	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.04	0.06	0.11
N	1,997	1,997	1,997	1,664	1,664	1,664

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

5. Discussion and conclusion

Investigating the connection of individual solidarity engagement and partisan affiliation across eight European countries, we find a cosmopolitan-communitarian cleavage influencing individual

solidarity – but not as could be assumed based on the rhetoric of ‘exclusive solidarity’ (Lefkofridi & Michel 2014) of right-wing populist parties: those subscribing to right-wing parties and feeling attached to national community do not engage more in support of co-nationals. Confirming our first hypothesis, the ideological partisan cleavage remains a reliable predictor of solidarity engagement distinguishing supporters of (center) left parties by their universal commitment to different groups of persons in need (both nationals and non-nationals) from supporters of (center) right parties with lower levels of engagement. The latter do not behave as communitarians by trading-off support of national community against transnational or European solidarity. Furthermore, supporters of right-wing populist parties are among those least engaged in solidarity towards all groups under investigation, with almost no attention towards the support of refugees’ rights. In short: (far) right-wing attachment is associated with lower solidarity mobilization.

In the literature, the cosmopolitan–communitarian divide in partisan contestation has been used to identify the new populist right as a distinct political force able to attract strong community oriented electorates who fear economic losses from the opening of borders but, above all, a loss of social cohesion and cultural identity. However, our respective second hypothesis is not supported by our empirical results, which instead reveal interesting correlations: While left supporters are more likely to put universalism in practice, the populist ideology of exclusive homogeneity of the national community of solidarity has no visible impact on individual solidarity towards members of the in-group. To the contrary, supporters of right-wing populist parties are rather distinct by not putting solidarity into practice towards others, be they nationals or non-nationals. Social cohesion is in this sense threatened most by those who most fervently defend the virtues of communal belonging and living together in national communities of solidarity.

How can we interpret these findings in the context of the existing literature on solidarity? Previous research leads us to expect that individuals put emphasis on the connection of solidarity with group membership/belonging/social proximity (Lahusen and Grasso 2018), as well as on perceptions of deservingness (van Oorschot 2000). Furthermore, previous studies indicated that political-ideological orientations predict whether people support welfare redistribution and other forms of solidarity (Giugni & Passy 2007; Mau & Burkhardt 2011; Likki & Staerklé, 2014). If combined with an ideology of exclusive group membership, variables such as social proximity and considerations of deservingness confirm the communitarian assumption of solidarity (Lahusen & Grasso 2018). Solidarity behavior across distance and in relation to considerations of generalized justice would indicate instead the impact of cosmopolitanism on individual solidarity behavior.

Looking at fringe parties, we find such predictions of solidarity behavior confirmed in the case of supporters of left parties across all countries, who tend to reject solidarity trade-offs and show highest levels of support towards in-groups *and* out-groups. Supporters of right-wing populist parties, by contrast, do not translate their rejection of humanitarian solidarity into support of community solidarity. The communitarian assumption (and pronouncements of right-wing populists) of nationally exclusive solidarity behavior is therefore not confirmed. Against an organic vision of society as community, supporters of right-wing populist parties show lower levels of solidarity engagement compared to supporters of other parties. Their solidarity behavior could of course be explained as an effect of marginalization or of generally low social and cultural capital in contrast to ‘cosmopolitans’ who are distinguished by privileged social and cultural background (Mau 2011). However, especially in Northern Europe far-right voters are not necessarily worse off (Spier 2010; Decker et al. 2016).

Regarding our third hypothesis of a convergence of right-wing-communitarian populism across Europe, distinguished by their trade-off between nationally bounded and transnational solidarity, we can indeed report an interesting finding: The populist right is not distinguished by putting communitarian values into practice but rather by their distance towards solidarity practices. Instead of strong in-group solidarity promoted by right-wing populists across Europe our findings allow to outline the contours of a European non-solidary populist right. The populist notion of representing the ‘pure people’ paired with anti-elitism and anti-cosmopolitanism achieves in this sense the opposite of what is claimed, i.e. supporting cohesion of the national community.. Right-wing populist parties’ supporters are in this sense similar in their strong emphasis on individual values and welfare chauvinism, but low interest in community commitment and solidarity.

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ⁱⁱ Further information, including the full questionnaire and, after an embargo period, the original dataset, is available at the project website www.transsol.eu.

ⁱⁱⁱ Attachment to smaller entities such as region and city were excluded as they remain ambiguous as indicators for communitarian versus cosmopolitan attitudes.

^{iv} For this analysis we see party families as too generalizing and painting over differences that might inform our findings. Furthermore, we would pretend similarity across party systems while, as formulated in our third hypothesis, we are actually interested in whether we find a generalizable (new) cosmopolitan-communitarian divide.

^v Participants were forced to answer all categories, thus the number of respondents stayed the same across issue fields.

^{vi} For party placement see the Chapel Hill Expert Survey <https://www.chesdata.eu/ches-stats/> (14.08.2018).

^{vii} Strong family values and Catholic notions of charity can explain solidarity engagement of supporters of the conservative UDC while we have no explanation why supporters of PD seem to tend to abstain from solidarity action.

Appendix

Table 3: Party attachment and solidarity activity in UK (in %)

Party	unemployed	disabled	refugees
Greens	27.1	44.9	34.6
Labour	26.0	36.8	30.8
SNP	27.9	50.0	39.7
Tories	16.5	35.4	16.9
LibDem	20.8	43.3	35.0
UKIP	14.0	32.5	9.5
No Party	11.2	26.1	12.4
DN	11.1	22.2	16.3
Total	17.9	33.9	20.7

Explanations: Greens - Green Party of England and Wales, Labour – Labour Party, SNP – Scottish National Party, LibDem – Liberal Democrats, Tories – Conservative Party, UKIP – UK Independence Party. Categories ‘Other’, Plaid, and BNP were excluded to to low N.

Table 4: Party attachment and solidarity activity in Denmark (in %)

Party	unemployed	disabled	refugees
Radikale	26.9	37.2	53.9
Soc Folks	31.5	47.7	44.6
Enheds	46.9	53.6	59.2
Socialdemocrats	33.1	52.7	40.6
Liberal	16.9	33.7	27.0
Konservat	19.2	53.9	24.4
Venstre	23.6	49.1	25.1
Dansk Folkeparti	25.9	47.3	13.8
No Party	20.3	39.6	22.6
DN	20.5	34.7	21.3
Total	27.7	46.2	31.3

Category ‘Other’ was excluded.

Table 5: Party attachment and solidarity activity in France (in %)

Party	unemployed	disabled	refugees
PC	52.4	54.8	28.6
PdG	44.6	64.3	42.0
PS	30.8	53.9	25.1
EELV	31.4	54.3	28.6
UMP	18.8	56.5	15.7
UDI	23.6	65.2	28.1
FN	18.7	43.7	15.2
No Party	16.9	42.5	12.2
DN	16.8	42.2	16.8
Total	22.7	49.3	18.9

Categories ‘Other’ and NC (low N) were excluded.

Table 6: Party attachment and solidarity activity in Italy (in %)

Party	unemployed	disabled	Refugees
PRC	55.8	58.1	53.5
SEL	41.4	46.6	39.7
PD	33.4	51.9	29.4
M5S	48.5	56.5	32.3
Forza Italia	38.3	56.0	34.0
Fratelli d'I	33.8	49.3	25.4
Lega Nord	36.2	49.3	20.7
No party	22.4	41.2	18.6
DN	29.6	36.4	21.6
Total	35.4	49.1	27.0

Explanations: PRC - Partito della Rifondazione Comunista, SEL - Sinistra Ecologia Libertà, PD - Partito Democratico, M5S - Movimento Cinque Stelle, Forza Italia, Fratelli d'I – Fratelli d'Italia, Lega Nord. Categories 'Other' and UMC were excluded due to low N.

Table 7: Party attachment and solidarity activity in Greece (in %)

Party	unemployed	disabled	refugees
KEE	75.3	54.8	28.6
Syriza	66.7	64.3	42.0
Plefsi	63.2	53.9	25.1
PASOK	53	54.3	28.6
Neo Democratia	62.9	56.5	15.7
Potami	51.9	65.2	28.1
Golden Dawn	53.7	43.7	15.2
No Party	50.6	42.5	12.2
DN	50.5	42.2	16.8
Total	54.6	49.3	18.9

Categories 'Other' and Centrist Union (low N) were excluded.

Table 8: Party attachment and solidarity activity in Poland (in %)

Party	unemployed	disabled	refugees
Razem	43.3	70.0	41.7
SLD	50.8	67.7	34.7
Nowoczesna	42.4	69.4	35.4
PO	43.7	74.5	36.8
PiS	48.9	72.4	33.5
Korwin	37.5	56.9	19.4
Kukiz15	50.3	71.7	32.4
No Party	30.5	55.4	14.7
DN	32.5	51.5	11.2
Total	40.2	64.5	26.5

Categories 'Other' and PSL (low N) were excluded.

Table 9: Party attachment and solidarity activity in Switzerland (in %)

Party	unemployed	disabled	refugees
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SP	42.7	71.8	47.5
Greens	41.7	76.4	51.4
Green-Lib	41.5	68.9	48.1
CVP	40.3	79.8	49.2
FDP	29.9	71.5	31.8
SVP	27.8	66.0	20.4
No Party	26.3	60.1	25.5
DN	26.3	58.1	22.9
Total	32.2	66.8	32.6

Categories 'Other', as well as EPP and BDP (low N) were excluded.

Table 13: Regression models France

	unemployed	disabled	refugees	unemployed	disabled	refugees
PC	0.321**	-0.020	0.122	0.316**	-0.022	0.124
PdG	0.250**	0.083	0.267**	0.213**	0.098	0.227**
PS	0.119**	-0.022	0.095**	0.111**	-0.049	0.067
EELV	0.156**	-0.002	0.162**	0.151**	0.013	0.143**
UMP	---	---	---	---	---	---
UDI	0.050	0.086	0.122*	0.011	0.034	0.071
FN	-0.004	-0.127**	-0.009	0.043	-0.070	0.046
No Party	-0.013	-0.134**	-0.023	0.004	-0.114**	-0.008
Don't know	-0.013	-0.142**	0.010	0.037	-0.037	0.018
Higher age				-0.042**	0.011	-0.046**
Male				0.077**	-0.019	0.046*
Higher income				0.001	0.027*	0.003
higher education				0.021	0.015	0.025
Att_Country				0.007	0.056**	-0.018
Att_EU				0.032**	0.009	0.055**
Att_Humanity				0.019	0.026	0.033**
_cons	0.190**	0.562**	0.158**	0.146**	0.553**	0.138**
R2	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.09
N	1,976	1,976	1,976	1,689	1,689	1,689

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 14: Regression models Italy

	unemployed	disabled	refugees	unemployed	disabled	refugees
PRC	0.179*	0.018	0.196**	0.155	-0.009	0.081*
SEL	0.029	-0.092	0.059	0.037	-0.060	0.072
PD	-0.055	-0.046	-0.053	-0.054	-0.064	-0.047
M5S	0.097*	-0.001	-0.026	0.101*	0.028	0.006
Forza Italia	---	---	---	---	---	---
Fratelli d'I	-0.062	-0.088	-0.106	-0.026	-0.028	-0.046
Lega Nord	-0.023	-0.065	-0.139**	0.044	-0.019	-0.066
No party	-0.167**	-0.161**	-0.160**	-0.165**	-0.144**	-0.127**
Don't know	-0.094	-0.201**	-0.126*	0.015	-0.098	-0.056
Higher age				-0.044**	0.021	-0.039**
Male				0.060*	0.056*	0.020
Higher income				-0.015	0.022	0.013
higher education				0.041**	0.033*	0.038**
Att_Country				-0.013	-0.002	-0.034**
Att_EU				0.023	0.016	0.064**
Att_Humanity				0.038**	0.040**	0.045**
_cons	0.386**	0.563**	0.345**	0.376**	0.539**	0.320**
R ²	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.07	0.04	0.07
N	2,017	2,017	2,017	1,650	1,650	1,650

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 15: Regression models Greece

	unemployed	disabled	refugees	unemployed	disabled	refugees
KEE	0.225**	-0.070	0.074	0.205**	-0.036	0.245**
Syriza	0.160**	0.031	0.278**	0.162**	-0.000	0.371**
Plefsi	0.051	0.243**	0.162**	0.064	0.269**	0.262**
PASOK	0.384**	0.099	0.035	0.360**	0.087	0.022
Neo Demokratia	---	---	---	---	---	---
Potami	0.113	0.102	0.102	0.123	0.066	0.157
Golden Dawn	0.140**	0.059	-0.146**	0.187**	0.057	0.046
No Party	0.081*	0.052	0.073*	0.099*	0.037	0.208**
Don't know	0.042	-0.015	0.014	0.203**	0.068	0.236**
Higher age				0.031*	-0.002	0.020
Male				0.073**	0.010	-0.003
Higher income				0.008	0.036**	0.038**
higher education				-0.004	0.017	-0.011
Att_Country				0.026	0.008	0.021
Att_EU				0.002	0.008	0.052**
Att_Humanity				-0.004	0.017	0.022
_cons	0.476**	0.581**	0.301**	0.425**	0.603**	0.209**
R2	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.08
N	1,853	1,853	1,853	1,627	1,627	1,627

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 16: Regression models Poland

	unemployed	disabled	refugees	unemployed	disabled	refugees
Razem	0.011	0.006	0.067	0.049	0.008	0.061
SLD	0.088	-0.012	-0.006	0.089	0.007	-0.004
Nowoczesna	---	---	---	---	---	---
PO	0.026	0.059	0.014	0.032	0.080	0.010
PiS	0.065	0.039	-0.018	0.107*	0.082	0.049
Korwin	-0.064	-0.125*	-0.170**	0.029	-0.037	-0.063
Kubiz15	0.071	0.023	-0.036	0.118*	0.101*	0.015
No Party	-0.126**	-0.142**	-0.213**	-0.094*	-0.083*	-0.171**
Don't know	-0.102*	-0.180**	-0.246**	-0.026	-0.013	-0.224**
Higher age				0.010	0.044**	0.004
Male				0.013	-0.015	-0.008
Higher income				-0.029*	0.018	-0.020
higher education				0.035*	0.033*	0.023
Att_Country				-0.004	0.016	-0.053**
Att_EU				0.031*	0.006	0.078**
Att_Humanity				-0.002	0.017	0.004
_cons	0.423**	0.689**	0.357**	0.391**	0.653**	0.316**
R2	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.08
N	2,071	2,071	2,071	1,682	1,682	1,682

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 17: Regression models Switzerland

	unemployed	disabled	refugees	unemployed	disabled	refugees
SP	0.044	-0.075	-0.026	0.007	-0.110	-0.176**
Greens	0.003	-0.047	0.010	-0.036	-0.039	-0.019
Green-Lib	0.029	-0.091	-0.023	0.008	-0.119	-0.061
CVP	---	---	---	---	---	---
FDP	-0.100	-0.072	-0.173**	-0.095	-0.096	-0.171**
SVP	-0.130**	-0.157**	-0.291**	-0.092	-0.158**	-0.222**
No Party	-0.142**	-0.200**	-0.265**	-0.109*	-0.218**	-0.263*

Don't know	-0.119*	-0.218**	-0.283**	-0.054	-0.124	-0.301**
Higher age				0.042**	0.060**	0.022
Male				0.069**	-0.023	-0.046*
Higher income				0.002	0.015	0.022
higher education				0.020	0.010	-0.001
Att_Country				-0.018	0.016	-0.062**
Att_EU				0.054**	0.007	0.060**
Att_Humanity				0.010	0.022	0.058**
_cons	0.404**	0.809**	0.506**	0.386**	0.837**	0.558**
R2	0.03	0.02	0.07	0.05	0.04	0.11
N	2,078	2,078	2,078	1,580	1,580	1,580

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 18: Variables used and recoding

Variable	Item(s)	recoding
Refugees	Have you ever done any of the following in order to support the rights of refugees/asylum seekers? 1. attended march, protest; 2. donate money; 3. donate time; 4. bought or refused to buy; 5. engaged as passive member; 6. engaged as active member ($r^2=0.55$)	0=0, 1= one activity, 2 = more than one activity
Unemployed	Have you ever done any of the following in order to support the rights of the unemployed? 1. attended march, protest; 2. donate money; 3. donate time; 4. bought or refused to buy; 5. engaged as passive member; 6. engaged as active member ($r^2=0.53$)	0=0, 1= one activity, 2 = more than one activity
disabled	Have you ever done any of the following in order to support disability rights? 1. attended march, protest; 2. donate money; 3. donate time; 4. bought or refused to buy; 5. engaged as passive member; 6. engaged as active member ($r^2=0.47$)	0=0, 1= one activity, 2 = more than one activity
age	How old are you?	Standardized
Income (list per country)	What is your household's MONTHLY net income? (ten decils)	Standardized
education	What is the highest level of education that you have completed? (ISCED-list)	Standardized
Gender	Are you male or female? 1=male, 2=female	0=female, 1=male
Att_Country	Please tell me how attached you feel to COUNTRY? (1-4)	Standardized
Att_EU	Please tell me how attached you feel to the European Union? (1-4)	Standardized
Att_Humanity	How attached do you feel towards all people/humanity? (1-4)	Standardized
		low correlation between the three attachment items